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RECENT CASES
SUPREME COURT HOLDS
ILLINOIS TAX ON INTERSTATE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
DOES NOT VIOLATE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
In Goldberg v. Sweet, - U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 582
(1989), the United States Supreme Court held
that the Illinois Telecommunications Excise Tax
Act ("the Tax Act"), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, pars.
2001-2021 (1987), did not violate the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.
Background
The Tax Act, enacted in 1985, imposes a 5% tax
on the gross charge of interstate telecommunications. The Tax Act specifically imposes the tax
on interstate telephone calls which originate or
terminate in Illinois and are charged to an Illinois service address, regardless of where the
telephone call is billed or paid. An identical tax is
imposed on intrastate telecommunications. In
addition, the Tax Act provides a credit to the
taxpayer if the taxpayer can demonstrate that
the telephone call in question has already been
taxed by another state.
Eight months after the Tax Act was passed,
Jerome Goldberg and Robert McTigue, Illinois
residents subject to the telecommunications tax,
filed a class action complaint in state court
against the Director of the Department of Revenue for the State of Illinois ("the Director") and
various long-distance telephone carriers, including Sprint. The complaint alleged that the Tax
Act was unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause.
Trial Court
The trial court found the Tax Act unconstitutional based on the four-prong test outlined in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977). The Complete Auto test finds a state tax
constitutional provided 'the tax is applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly
related to the services provided by the State."'
109 S. Ct. at 587, quoting Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). The trial

court determined that the tax was not fairly
apportioned and thus, that the Tax Act was
unconstitutional.
Illinois Supreme Court
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's finding of unconstitutionality. The IUinois Supreme Court also found that the tax was
not apportioned because Illinois was potentially
taxing telephone calls which could also be taxed
by other states. However, the court was satisfied
that the credit provision in the Tax Act virtually
eliminated the threat of multiple taxation. The
court reasoned, therefore, that the apportionment requirement of the Complete Auto test
had been met. The court also held that the tax
was not discriminatory because intrastate calls,
as well as interstate calls, were taxed. In addition,
the court found that the tax was fairly related to
services provided by Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court thus held the Tax Act valid under
the Commerce Clause. Goldberg, McTigue and
Sprint appealed to the United States Supreme
Court asserting that the tax was not fairly apportioned.
United States Supreme Court: The Complete
Auto Test
The Court first noted the policy considerations behind the Complete Auto test. Complete
Auto rejected the notion that any tax on interstate commerce is unconstitutional and, at the
same time, attempted to set forth some limits on
the power of the states to tax interstate commerce. All the parties agreed that Illinois had a
substantial nexus with the interstate telephone
calls and thus that the first prong of the test had
been met. Thus, the Court began its analysis with
the second prong of the Complete Auto test.
Second Prong of Complete Auto:
Apportionment
The Court stated that the "purpose behind
the apportionment requirement is to ensure
that each State taxes only its fair share of an
interstate transaction." 109 S. Ct. at 588. Although the Constitution does not mandate a
particular apportionment formula, the Court
has found an internal and external consistency
test to be suitable for determining whether a tax
is fairly apportioned.

A tax passes the "internally consistent" test if it
is structured so that if every state were to impose
an identical tax no multiple taxation would
result. Appellant Sprint argued that the challenged tax should be compared to similar, not
identical, taxes imposed by other states. The
Court disagreed. The Court reasoned that such a
comparison was unworkable because the validity of state taxes would then turn on "'the shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other
States."' 109 S. Ct. at 588, quoting Armco, Inc. v.
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638,645 (1984). Therefore, the
Court applied the "identical tax" standard and
found that the Tax Act satisfied the internally
consistent test. The Court conjectured that if
only those interstate telephone calls which are
charged to a service address within the state are
taxed, then only that state would tax each call.
The "externally consistent" test is met if a tax
applies only to revenues reasonably reflecting
the in-state portion of the activity being taxed.
The first part of the Court's externally consistent
analysis focused on the economic effects of the
tax. The Director argued that the economic
effect of the Tax Act was very similar to that of a
sales tax. The Court agreed with this argument
because the tax imposed by the Tax Act has many
of the characteristics of a sales tax: it is assessed
against the individual consumer, it is collected
by the retailer, and it reasonably reflects the way
consumers purchase interstate telephone calls.
The Court next focused on the Tax Act's
potential for multiple taxation. The problem of
multiple taxation could result if a consumer
splits his or her billing and service addresses
between two different states. In such a case,
both the billing state and the service state would
have a substantial nexus with the interstate telephone call and multiple taxation could result.
The Court held the Tax Act protects against multiple taxation because its credit provision provides a credit to the consumer for sales taxes that
have been paid in other states. Although a slight
risk exists that multiple taxation could result, the
Court concluded that the risk is low and in fact
prohibited by the credit provision of the Tax
Act itself.
Lastly, the Court noted the practical limitations on apportionment. Whereas the Court had
previously endorsed apportionment formulas
based on the number of miles a train, truck, or
bus traveled within the taxing state, that formula
could not be applied to the "travels" of an inter-

state telephone call. An interstate telephone call
consists of electronic signals traveling throughout a complex computer network. In addition, a
call from a specific origin to a specific destination may not always take the same path. A computer automatically activates a different path if a
direct path is not available. Therefore, the Court
determined that an exact apportionment formula like that used in the transportation cases
would be unduly burdensome if applied to
interstate telephone calls. Accordingly, the Court
found that the Illinois legislature had reached a
pragmatic solution to the problem of apportioning taxes in the present-day computerized world.
Third Prong of Complete Auto: Discrimination
The appellants argued that although there is a
5% tax on both interstate and intrastate calls, the
Tax Act discriminates against the former because
a larger share of the tax burden is allocated to
interstate calls. The Court disagreed with this
argument for two reasons. First, the economic
burden of the tax falls, in either case, on the
Illinois taxpayer who is able to change the tax
through the Illinois political process. The Court
emphasized that "[i]t is not a purpose of the
Commerce Clause to protect state residents
from their own state taxes." 109 S. Ct. at 591.
Second, the exact portion of the thousands of
electronic signals comprising a single telephone
call which fall within a particular state cannot be
accurately determined. For these reasons the
Court concluded that the Tax Act does not discriminate against interstate commerce.
Fourth Prong of Complete Auto: Fair Relation to
the Presence and Activities of the Taxpayer
The purpose of the fair relation requirement is
to ensure that the tax burden is placed on those
persons actually benefiting from the services
provided by the state. The Court held that this
requirement should not be construed to limit
the tax to the cost of services provided by Illinois
to telecommunications equipment within Illinois. Instead, this requirement focuses on the
wide range of benefits provided to the consumer. For example, here the benefits received by
the Illinois taxpayer are not limited to the cost of
servicing telephone equipment. The Illinois taxpayer also receives such benefits as telephone
service, rental of telephone equipment, and
police and fire protection. The Court concluded
that the Tax Act is fairly related to the benefits
received by Illinois taxpayers.
(continued on page 100)
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Concurring Opinions
Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's reasons for concluding that the Tax Act does not discriminate against
interstate commerce. Justice Stevens noted that
at least on the surface, the Tax Act appears to
discriminate against interstate commerce because interstate calls bear a heavier tax burden.
However, both Justices Stevens and O'Conner
concluded that the practical economic effect of

PENNSYLVANIA LAW
PREVENTING PUBLIC UTILITIES
FROM RECOVERING
FINANCIAL LOSSES THROUGH
RATES OR AMORTIZATION
UPHELD
In Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, - U.S.
109 S. Ct. 609 (1989), the United States Supreme
Court held that a Pennsylvania statute preventing a public utility company from recovering
construction costs of cancelled plants does not
violate the Takings Clause of the fifth amendment of the Constitution. The Court ruled that a
state is free to set rates for public utilities which
balance the interests of the utilities and the
public.
Background
In 1967, two public utility companies, Duquesne Light Company ("Duquesne") and Pennsylvania Power Company ("Penn Power"), decided to increase their generating capacity.
Duquesne and Penn Power entered into an
agreement with several other electric utilities to
construct seven nuclear generating units. In
1980, the construction of four of the facilities was
halted in part due to the Arab oil embargo and
the Three Mile Island accident. The demand for
electricity as well as the desirability of nuclear
energy as a means to meet that demand had
changed. Duquesne and Penn Power respectively had expended $34,697,389 and $9,569,665
in construction costs by the time the project was
cancelled.
In 1980 and 1981 Duquesne petitioned the
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission ("the
PUC") to gain permission to recoup its losses
-'

the Tax Act is to proportionately tax both intrastate and interstate calls. Justice O'Connor also
disagreed with the majority's application of the
internal consistency test to state taxes challenged under the Commerce Clause. Finally,
Justice Scalia concurred with the judgment of
the majority and stated that only those taxes that
facially discriminate against interstate commerce
violate the Commerce Clause.
Mary L. Smith

over a ten-year period. The PUC found that the
cancellation of the project was reasonable given
the circumstances and permitted Duquesne and
Penn Power to amortize expenditures over a
ten-year period. In 1982, Duquesne again petitioned the PUC to obtain a rate increase. In 1983,
the PUC allowed Duquesne to increase its revenues $105.8 million to a total yearly revenue
exceeding $800 million. The rate increase included $3.5 million in revenue which represented the first payment to Duquesne for its loss
from the plants' cancellation. The PUC granted
Penn Power the authority to increase its revenues by $15.4 million to a total of $184.2 million.
This increase included the first year of the tenyear amortization recovery.
Prior to the close of the Duquesne rate proceeding in 1982, the Pennsylvania legislature
enacted a law which amended the Pennsylvania
Utility Code ("the Act"). The Act prohibited the
cost of construction of a utility plant undertaken
by a public utility from being included in the
rate base or in rates charged by the utility until
the facility is "used and useful" to the public.
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, § 1315 (Purdon 1988). Pursuant to the Act, the Pennsylvania Office of the
Consumer Advocate ("the Consumer Advocate") requested that the PUC reconsider its
order allowing Duquesne to amortize its losses.
The PUC reaffirmed its prior decision, interpreting the Act as excluding the costs of canceled
facilities from the rate base but not as precluding
recovery of costs through amortization.
The Consumer Advocate appealed the PUC's
decision to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court, which held that the PUC had interpreted
the Act correctly. The Consumer Advocate then
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

